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We consider a model that demonstrates the crucial role of inertia and stickiness in multi-agent
systems, based on the Minority Game (MG). The inertia of an agent is introduced into the game
model by allowing agents to apply hypothesis testing when choosing their best strategies, thereby
reducing their reactivity towards changes in the environment. We find by extensive numerical
simulations that our game shows a remarkable improvement of global cooperation throughout the
whole phase space. In other words, the maladaptation behavior due to over-reaction of agents
is removed. These agents are also shown to be advantageous over the standard ones, which are
sometimes too sensitive to attain a fair success rate. We also calculate analytically the minimum
amount of inertia needed to achieve the above improvement. Our calculation is consistent with the
numerical simulation results. Finally, we review some related works in the field that show similar
behaviors and compare them to our work.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 02.50.-r, 05.40.-a, 89.75.-k
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing interest in studying artificial agents-
interacting models which are able to generate global be-
haviors found in social, biological and economical sys-
tems [1]. Examples such as matching games [2] and
ideal gas models of trading markets [3] show that this
approach commonly used by physicists can be nicely ap-
plied to problems lay outside the discipline. One exciting
fact is that these artificial models, although contain sim-
ple governing rules, can still generate non-trivial global
cooperative behaviors [4, 5]. In these self-organized com-
plex systems, agents can reach equilibrium states through
adaptation, a dynamical learning process initiated by the
feedback mechanism present in these systems.
People possesses inertia when making decisions and
switching strategies in economical systems. Conceptu-
ally, this inertia is similar to the one used by Newton to
describe the body motions in the physical world. It refers
to how reluctant a person is going to drop his/her current
economics plan and look for another one, just like an ob-
ject is reluctant to change its motion state. Inertia may
originate from: (1) the cost needed to change strategies,
(2) the low sensitivity towards a change in environment
and (3) the loss-aversion behavior in human [6] — peo-
ple loves to fight back from loss [7]. Like different bod-
ies may have different mass in classical physical systems,
different people may carry different inertia in economi-
cal markets. In this paper, we introduce a simple model
to study the idea of inertia. This model gives striking
improvement of cooperative behavior, such as removal
of maladaptation [8] and dynamically increase of diver-
sity among agents, without any necessity to alter initial
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conditions and payoff mechanism. Actually, studies of
a few variants of MG also show improvement in cooper-
ations [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. We shall further discuss their
results and compare with ours in Section VI after finished
reporting our model and results.
Our model is a modification of a famous econophysical
model known as MG, proposed by Challet and Zhang in
1997 [5, 14]. MG is a simple game model that captures
the minority seeking behavior found in stock markets
and resources competitions. (See Refs. [15, 16, 17] for
an overview of econophysics and MG.) In MG, N agents
struggle to choose between two options repetitively, ei-
ther buy (0) or sell (1) in each turn. Those who have
chosen the minority sides are winners at that turn and
are awarded 1 dollar, otherwise they lose 1 dollar. The
only information they received is the history of the game,
which is a binary bit string composed of the minority
choices of previous M turns. A strategy is a map from
the set of all possible histories to the set of two options.
If a strategy predicts the minority correctly, it is added
1 virtual score point, otherwise it loses 1 virtual score
point. Each agent is assigned S strategies once and for
all at the beginning of the game in order to aid his/her
decision. In standard MG, an agent makes decision based
on his/her best current strategy at hand, namely, the one
with the highest virtual score.
Clearly, there are 2M possible histories and hence 22
M
available strategies. However, out of the whole strategy
space, only 2M+1 of them are significantly different. The
diversity of the population is measured by α, which is
equal to 2M+1/NS. The smaller the α, the more similar
are the strategies hold by agents. Up to first order ap-
proximation, the dynamics of MG is determined by this
control parameter α. [18, 19, 20]
The most sparkling macroscopic observable in MG is
perhaps the variance of option attendance per agents
σ2/N . It represents the wastage of the system and fluc-
2tuation of resources allocation; the smaller σ2/N , the
more the whole population benefits. Researchers found
that σ2/N falls below the value that all agents make
their choices randomly in a certain range of α. This
indicates that agents are cooperating although they are
independent and selfish. More importantly, there is a
phase transition at the critical point αc which divides
the σ2/N against α curve into the so-called symmetric
phase (α < αc) and asymmetric phase (α > αc). [21]
II. OUR MODEL
To incorporate inertia into MG, we introduce a
new modification – Hypothesis Testing Minority Game
(HMG). Hypothesis testing is a standard statistical tool
to test whether an effect emerged from an independent
variable appears by chance or luck. In the standard ver-
sion of MG, the best strategy is defined as the strategy
with the highest virtual score. In HMG, however, an
agent k determines his/her own best strategies by testing
the following null hypothesis H0: The current strategy
Sk,0 performs better than the other strategy Sk,1 avail-
able to agent k. Note that we have restricted ourselves
to the simplest case S = 2, but the model can be easily
extended to S > 2 cases under the same formalism. This
agent possesses an sustain level Ik ≥ 1/2 on his/her cur-
rent strategy Sk,0, which is the same as the confidence
level on the validity of the null hypothesis we commonly
use in hypothesis testing (that is, the acceptance area of
a standard normal). This Ik defines how much he/she
could sustain the under-performance of Sk,0 and thereby
represents his/her inertia.
The H0 of a particular agent k can be quantitatively
written as
H0 :
Ωk,0(τk)− Ωk,1(τk)
δk
> xk, (1)
where
1√
2π
∫ +∞
xk
e−x
2/2dx = Ik. (2)
Here, Ωk,j(τk) is the virtual score of a particular strategy
Sk,j at τk, where τk is the number of time steps counted
from his/her adoption of Sk,0 for that individual agent.
The dominator δk represents the fluctuation of strate-
gies’ performance the agent perceived. An agent k would
continue to stick on his/her current strategy Sk,0 until
Ωk,j(τk) descends outside his/her sustain level. Then
he/she has to admit that H0 is not likely to be true,
rejects it and shift to the other strategy. After a change
of strategy, the virtual scores of both strategies are reset
to 0 and τk is set back to 1.
The higher the value of Ik, the milder his/her response
and the more reluctant for him/her in shifting strategies.
In this way, Ik plays the role of inertia of an agent in this
game. Agents with Ik = 1/2 would be most similar to
standard MG agent, they employ strategy with the high-
est virtual score. However, there are still two differences:
these HMG agents would still stick on current strategy
in case of a tie in virtual scores, and the virtual scores
will be reseted after shifts in strategies.
We remark that randomness are involved in only three
places in HMG, namely, (1) the initial assignment of
strategies and inertia; (2) the choice of a new strategy
in case of a tie in the virtual scores of the alternative
strategies when a player has decided to drop the current
one; as well as (3) the determination of the winning side
in case of a tie. Thus, the dynamics of HMG is deter-
ministic when played by an odd number of agents each
carrying 2 strategies.
III. PURE POPULATION WITH RANDOM
WALK APPROXIMATION
We have performed extensive numerical simulation on
our model. With the presence of inertia among agents,
every agent needs a longer time to make up his/her mind
and the equilibration time in HMG is lengthened. We
take the value of σ2 every 1,000 time steps and regard
the system as having equilibrated if the percentage differ-
ence of successive measurement is smaller than ǫ = 10−6.
Upon equilibration, we take our measurement by record-
ing the dynamics of the next 25,000 time steps. Further-
more, we repeat this data taking procedure 150 times,
each with an independent set of initial conditions.
In a population where everyone tries to cling on the mi-
nority side as long as possible, agents may have different
inertia Ik, and some may have no inertia at all (standard
MG agents). We first study the behavior of HMG when
every agent has the same Ik. (We shall move on to study
the mixed population case in later sections.) We begin
our study by determining the value of δk, a perception
of agents on the fluctuation of virtual score difference
between two strategies. A naive guess would be assum-
ing Ωk,j(τk) performs random walk for all strategies j
throughout the game, then δk equals
√
2τk.
Fig. 1 shows a plot of the variance of attendance for
a particular option σ2/N against the control parameter
α for different inertia I, with δk set to
√
2τk. There is a
huge drop of σ2/N when I is sufficiently large, especially
in symmetric phase when α is small (see Fig. 2). Not just
the maladaptation in symmetric phase is greatly reduced,
but the cooperation between agents is also improved in
the asymmetric phase for certain values of I.
The reduction of system wastage in the asymmetric
phase (α > αc) is believed to be resulted by increasing
stickiness of agents on current strategies and elongating
their observing time. This leads to an increase of frozen
agents (see Fig. 3) and an more effective crowd-anticrowd
cancellation, succeeding in better cooperation. [21, 22,
23]
However, things become more complicated when α <
αc. From now on, this article will focus on the striking
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FIG. 1: The variance of attendance per agent σ2/N against
the system complexity α for I equals (a) 0.53, (b) 0.6 and (c)
0.9, setting δk equals
√
2τk. Here, N = 501 and S = 2. The
dashed line represents the σ2/N curve in standard MG.
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FIG. 2: The variance of attendance per agent σ2/N against
the I at α = 0.06, setting δk equals
√
2τk. Here, N = 501, S
= 2 and M = 5.
improvement of cooperation in the symmetric phase. The
removal of maladaptation in this region is directly related
to the disappearance of periodic dynamics that normally
present in the standard MG. The periodic dynamics is
a result of oversampling of strategy space and common
zero initial conditions among agents when α < αc, ac-
counting for the high volatility in the symmetric phase.
It is reflected in a prominent period 2M+1 peak in the au-
tocorrelation of the attendance time series of a particular
option [8, 19, 20, 24, 25]. Fig. 4 shows an evidence of this
postulate: as shown from the autocorrelation function,
periodic dynamics appears in the case I = 0.53 which
has high σ2/N in Figs. 1 and 2, while the low σ2/N
cases I = 0.6 and I = 0.9 show no trace of this signal.
What is the critical limit of I in order to remove the
maladaptation? To answer this, we have to look closely
into the periodic dynamics that governs the maladapta-
tion in the symmetric phase. Earlier study stated that
virtual scores of strategies are likely to reset to 0 every
2M+1 number of steps through the periodic dynamics in
the symmetric phase. Initially all strategies have 0 score
point, whenever a strategy β wins a bet in a particular
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FIG. 3: The frozen probability φ against α for different I by
setting δk equals
√
2τk. The dashed line represents the frozen
probability of the standard agents in MG. Here, N = 501, S
= 2 and M = 5.
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FIG. 4: The autocorrelation of attendance C0 against various
interval ∆ on cases (a) standard MG, (b) I = 0.53, (c) I =
0.6 and (d) I = 0.9 averaged over 50 independent runs. Here,
N = 501, M = 5 and S = 2.
µ, most agents would rush to β which is 2 score points
ahead its anti-correlated partner β¯ in the next appear-
ance of µ. It is likely that they would lose due to this
overcrowding. In this manner, the virtual scores of all
strategies are reset at this stage. This loop repeats with
interval 2M+1 and leads to the large fluctuation of option
attendance in the symmetric phase. [26]
Therefore, the question becomes when this reset and
oscillate mechanism will disappear. Actually, the peri-
odic dynamics is destroyed when agents are no longer
sensitive enough to immediately shift to a strategy stand-
ing out after winning a bet. The criteria for this situation
to occur is given by:
−2√
2 · 2M+1
< xk, (3)
where xk satisfies Eq. (2). If the value of I satisfies the
inequality (3), agents would no longer be constrained by
the periodic dynamics every 2M+1 steps. Then, a re-
recognizing process will draw in. In the standard MG, all
4identical strategies have same virtual scores throughout
the game. However, in HMG agents would clear all vir-
tual scores after changing strategies. This move is done in
multifarious time steps for different agents, depending on
the combination of strategies in their hands. Hence, the
scores of identical strategies eventually diverges if they
are hold by different agents, and these strategies may
be employed again in multifarious time in the future.
The net effect of this re-recognizing process is diversi-
fying strategies in the population intrinsically. In this
way, both the oversampling and overcrowding found in
the symmetric phase are relaxed, lowering the volatility.
For instance, when M = 5, the limit xc equals
−2/
√
2 · 25+1 = −0.177; that is, I ≃ 0.57. This criteria
is confirmed in Figs. 2 and 4 — all cases that show no pe-
riodic dynamics satisfies Eq. (3) and have low variances.
Note that for the cases where I does not exceed this
limit, their correlation signals are much stronger than
that of the standard MG (see Fig. 4b). It is because
the dynamics of HMG is more deterministic than that of
the standard MG as HMG agents will continue to stick
on current strategy when facing a tie in strategy virtual
scores, which happens during a reset. That means their
actions repeat during this reset and the system path is
more likely to repeat, resulting in stronger correlation.
This is like removing the random dice in standard MG
when facing a tie in virtual scores, a periodic signal as
strong as this case is also obtained.
IV. PURE POPULATION WITH RUNTIME δk
Actually, the movement of the virtual score difference
between two strategies is not likely to perform random
walk. Another possible way in perceiving δk is to put it
as the actual standard deviation of this difference in run-
time, which represents a more realistic market scenario.
That is,
δk =
√
〈(Ωk,0(τk)− Ωk,1(τk))2〉τk − 〈Ωk,0(τk)− Ωk,1(τk)〉2τk .
(4)
The results are very similar to the previous case, which
are shown in Figs. 5–7. However, the critical value of I
for the system to escape from the grip of periodic dynam-
ics appears to be higher. Remind that the virtual score
difference of two strategies performs random walk with
following step sizes and probabilities p:
Ωk,0 − Ωk,1 =


+2 with p = 1/4,
−2 with p = 1/4,
0 with p = 1/2.
(5)
Meanwhile, the presence of periodic dynamics ensure a
reset every 2M+1 number of time steps. We can approx-
imately calculate the average variance by considering all
possible traveling paths, which equals 2M+1/12 (detail
mathematics is shown in the Appendix). For instance,
when M = 5, the critical value for the periodic dynamics
to disappear is xc < −2/
√
25+1/12 = −0.866; that is,
I ≃ 0.81. This value of I is consistent with the data pre-
sented in Figs. 6 and 7. Again, we believe that after the
breaking of periodic dynamics, the re-recognizing process
mentioned in the previous section comes in and diversifies
the strategy space, resulting in a drop of fluctuation.
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FIG. 5: The variance of attendance per agent σ2/N against
the system complexity α for I equals (a) 0.55, (b) 0.6 and (c)
0.9, with δk given by Eq. (4). Here, N = 501 and S = 2. The
dashed line represents the σ2/N curve in standard MG.
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FIG. 6: The variance of attendance per agent σ2/N against
I at α = 0.06, setting δk satisfying Eq. (4). Here, N = 501,
S = 2 and M = 5.
V. MIXED POPULATION WITH STANDARD
MG AGENTS
It is already clear that a pure population of agents hav-
ing inertia reduces system wastage. Now it is instructive
to study whether these agents (sticky agents) is advan-
tageous over standard MG agents (sensitive agents) in a
mixed population.
Fig. 8 gives the success rates of both races against γ
in the mixed population with I = 0.9, where γ is the
fraction of sticky agents in the population. Clearly, these
sticky agents take advantages of the sensitive agents for
whole range of γ, they successes in maintaining their suc-
cess rates close to 0.5. The sensitive agents are believed
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FIG. 7: The autocorrelation of attendance C0 against various
interval i on cases (a) standard MG, (b) I = 0.55, (c) I = 0.6
and (d) I = 0.9 averaged over 50 independent runs. Here, N
= 501, M = 5 and S = 2 and δk given by Eq. (4).
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FIG. 8: A plot of success rate of sticky agents Wh, sensitive
agentsWs and the whole populationW against the fraction of
sticky agents γ in the mixed race. There are total 501 agents,
with M = 5, S = 2 and I = 0.9.
to be tightened by the periodic dynamics, making them
to keep on losing. On the other hand, sticky agents are
likely to win more frequently as they are resistant to fol-
low the oscillation. Note that the whole population also
benefits from adding in more sticky agents (see the tri-
angles in Fig. 8). When γ is increased up to about 0.6,
Ws starts to rise. It is because the crowd of sensitive
agents is no longer large enough to override the net ac-
tions made by sticky agents, and therefore there is no
more periodic dynamics existing. Fig. 9 confirms our
suspicion, the periodic dynamics disappear around γ =
0.6. We have also performed simulations on mixed pop-
ulation of sensitive agents and sticky agents with other
values of I. As expected, sticky agents are only advan-
tageous with I exceeds the critical value that allow them
to escape from periodic dynamics mentioned in the last
section. Otherwise, all agents in the whole population
would still suffers from overcrowding and no one will be
benefited.
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FIG. 9: The autocorrelation of attendance C0 for different γ
averaged over 50 independent runs. Here, N = 501, M = 5,
S = 2 and I = 0.9.
VI. PREVIOUS STUDIES IN THE
LITERATURE AND COMPARISON WITH OUR
RESULTS
The reduction of the volatility by modifying the rules
or the initial conditions of the standard MG is not a new
idea in the field, especially for the symmetric phase. A
few previous studies have shown results quite similar to
that of the HMG. Here, we would like to first give a
short review of these works and to compare them with
our study.
A. Thermal Minority Game
Cavagna et al. proposed the Thermal Minority Game
(TMG) [9], which adds stochasticity into the standard
MG. In TMG, an agent does not employ the strategy
with highest virtual score strict a way, rather he/she
would use a strategy with probability calculated accord-
ing to its virtual score and a fixed inverse temperature T .
In other words, the employment of strategies by agents
become probabilistic with the degree of stochasticity de-
pending on T . They found that for certain range of T ,
the volatility in the game is reduced in most range of
the control parameter α. That is, in both symmetric
phase and asymmetric phases, TMG succeeds in raising
the degree of cooperation between agents by introducing
noises into the decision process of strategy selection for
individual agents.
In search of the continuous time dynamics of TMG,
Garrahan et al. confirm by numerical simulation that
the dynamics in the symmetric phase of MG is sensitive
to initial conditions. In particular, they reported that
the volatility would drop far from the original value if
random initial conditions to strategies (with O(1) initial
virtual scores for a population of 100 agents) are assigned
at the beginning of the game. [10]
6B. Nash equilibrium
In searching the replica solution and the Nash equilib-
rium for the symmetric phase of the standard MG, Chal-
let et al. found that the Nash equilibrium is not unique
and agents at these equilibria use pure strategies (that
is, they either always choose 1 or always choose 0). [11]
In Nash equilibrium, agents perform much better than in
the standard MG, the volatility is greatly suppressed in
the symmetric phase.
C. Consideration of agents’ own market impact in
evaluation of strategy
Challet et al. try to let the agents consider their own
impact on the market during the evaluations of all strate-
gies available to them. That is, the virtual score of
a strategy is proportional to the cumulated payoff the
agent would have received had he or she always played
the strategy. Although the difference between this evalu-
ation of virtual score and the original one is believed to be
small (∼ 1/√N), the volatility is found to be far lower
than the original MG. This difference is not negligible
because of finite size effect and the high degree of over-
sampling of the strategy space when α < αc. However,
this setting is computational intensive and unrealistic, as
people in real market usually can only obtain information
on his/her own current wealth and unlikely to try out all
strategies. [11]
D. The analytical solutions of batch minority game
and the on-line minority game
In batch minority game, the virtual score of a par-
ticular strategy is updated as discrete accumulated ef-
fect of order N iterations in the standard MG model,
whereas the MG having the original updating method
can be viewed as a “online” minority game in the neural
network sense. After adding in stochasticity, initial eval-
uations and generalizing these game to continuous time
limit, Coolen’s group has extensively written out the ana-
lytical solutions of these two versions of MG. They found
that in symmetric phase their theory pointed at the exis-
tence of a critical value for the initial strategy valuations
above the system would revert to a state with vanishing
volatility. [12, 13]
E. Introduction of diversity
Wong et al. pointed out in [8] that the maladaptation
observed in the symmetric phase in the standard MG is
originated from the fact that initial virtual scores of all
strategies are the same. They then studied the effect of
introducing diversity R/N into the game, where R is the
range of randomly assigned initial scores to strategies at
the beginning of the game and N is the number of agents.
They found that by increasing the diversity, the maladap-
tive behaviour observed in the symmetric phase α < αc
is reduced and hence the cooperation among agents is
promoted.
F. Comparison to our model
From the above studies, we can conclude that the
volatility would suppressed under following conditions:
(1) randomly allocating initial strategy score over a criti-
cal value, (2) adding in noise or stochasticity in choosing
a strategy, (3) assigning pure strategy or (4) taking an
agent’s impact on market into account when evaluating
all strategies.
Firstly, we would like to stress that the main focus in
this article is to provide a simple formalism to incorpo-
rate inertia into a multi-agent system such as MG, as
well as recording its influence to the dynamics of the
game. In HMG, there is no prior preference in strategies
for they have the same initial virtual score. Unlike the
standard MG, soon after the commencement of HMG,
the preference of a strategy is determined by both the
virtual score differences between strategies at hand and
inertia Ik of agent k. Through the presence of inertia,
each agent will gradually develop their own preference
in strategies through dynamical adaptation. In this re-
spect, even though the presence of inertia may eventually
lead to difference views of an identical strategy between
agents, this is achieved by an adaptive process through
the dynamics of the system but not by artificially assign-
ing a spread of initial virtual scores. This is a marked dif-
ference between HMG and the works of Wong et al. [8],
Garrahan et al. [10] as well as Coolen et al. [12, 13].
More importantly, the spreading of initial virtual scores
of strategies would only leads to a drop of volatility in
the symmetric phase, but not the asymmetric phase. In
HMG, however, there is a global improvement in both
phases for certain value of I.
We believed the TMG presents results most similar to
our game. In both case, the degree of cooperation are
raised in most range of α. However, as mentioned pre-
viously, TMG achieve this by adding stochasticity and
noise into agents’ choice of best strategies. Meanwhile,
in HMG agents are deterministic when choosing their
best strategies: they stick to their current strategy until
it is outperform to certain threshold, this does not in-
volve any stochasticity. In fact, the dynamics of HMG is
deterministic when played by an odd number of agents
each carrying 2 strategies.
Lastly, we think that using pure strategies and taking
agents’ themselves into account when evaluating all their
strategies are impractical and unrealistic situations. Our
model provide a natural, realistic way to prompt coop-
eration, meanwhile demonstrating the effect of stickiness
when people moving around investment strategies.
7VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have successfully introduced the concept of inertia
into the Minority Game, which shows a remarkable im-
provement of cooperation among agents in most range of
α, especially in the symmetric phase α < αc. We also
compare our findings with a few variants of MG reported
in the literature. We calculated the critical values of in-
ertia needed to uplift the cooperation behaviors, which
depends on how agents perceive the fluctuation of vir-
tual score difference between strategies. This reduction
of sensitivity among agents is found to be useful in re-
moving maladaptation due to over-reaction. In contrast,
if every action is smooth and all agents response to infor-
mation in no time, they will suffer from a overcrowd loss
easily. Meanwhile, agents carrying stickiness seems to
perform much better than sensitive agents. Our findings
suggest that inertia (or stickiness) is crucial and bene-
ficial to a society. It is hoped that the role of inertia
will be investigated in more detail based on our model
HMG, such as the effect of giving a diversifying range
of inertia to a population. It is also instructive to apply
our method of modeling inertia to study inertia effect in
other multi-agent systems.
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APPENDIX
In this appendix, we consider a simple random walk
of a cumulative sum xt after time t. At each step, xt
increases (decreases) by 1 if moves upward (downward)
with probability 1/2. We also impose a boundary condi-
tion that the sum is equal to 0 at both t = 0 and t = T .
A schematic diagram is shown in Fig. 10. Under such
constraint, we find that the variance of xt averages over
all possible paths σ2r =
t(T−t)
4T . Using this formula, we
can evaluate the average standard deviation of virtual
score difference of an agent’s strategies within a period
2M+1, that is the δk mentioned in Eq. (4).
First, we need to know the probability of xt within k
and k + dk, which is given by [27]
P (k ≤ xt ≤ k + dk) ≈
√
2
πt
e−2k
2/tdk. (6)
Hence, the probability of the cumulative sum xt to be
within k and k + dk at time t and xT to be within l and
l + dl at time T can be expressed by
P (k ≤ xt ≤ k + dk and l ≤ xT ≤ l + dl)
l
k dk
t
t
T
dl
FIG. 10: A schematic sketch showing a typical random walk
of particle travels for T time step.
= P (k ≤ xt ≤ k + dk) · P (l − k ≤ xT−t ≤ l − k + dl)
(7)
where t ≤ T . The equality follows from the fact that
the discrete steps size is equal to 1. Using the Eqs. (6)
and (7), the conditional probability
P (k ≤ xt ≤ k + dk|l ≤ xT ≤ l + dl)
=
P (k ≤ xt ≤ k + dk and l ≤ xT ≤ l + dl)
P (l ≤ xT ≤ l + dl) (8)
=
√
2
pite
−2k2/t ·
√
2
pi(T−t)e
−2(l−k)2/(T−t)dkdl√
2
piT e
−2l2/T dl
. (9)
By the boundary condition, 0 ≤ xT ≤ dl, then we have
P (k ≤ xt ≤ k + dk|0 ≤ xT ≤ dl)
=
√
2T
πt(T − t)e
−2Tk2/t(T−t)dk. (10)
Therefore, the variance σ2r averaged over all possible
paths:
σ2r =
∫ +∞
−∞
k2P (k ≤ xt ≤ k + dk|0 ≤ xT ≤ dl) (11)
=
t(T − t)
4T
. (12)
In order to calculate δ2k, we should rescale σ
2
r because
the virtual score difference of an agent’s strategies can
move two steps upward (+2), two steps downward(−2) or
keep stationary(0). Hence, by approximating the travel
time T consists infinity number of time steps:
δ2k = 2 ·
1
T
∫ T
0
t(T − t)
4T
dt =
T
12
. (13)
where δk is the perceived fluctuation mentioned in
Eq. (4).
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